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Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol binds the level of greenhouse gas emissions in
participating countries. It does, however, not dictate how the countries
are to achieve this level. The economic costs of reaching emission targets
are generally evaluated to be low. For example, evaluations with applied
general-equilibrium models estimate the costs to be in the range of 0.2%
to 0.5% of GDP, when international trade in emissions rights among gov-
ernments is allowed for. We argue that important costs are overlooked
since governments are inclined to choose highly distorting tax schemes.
This paper shows that governments generally choose diﬀerent energy
tax rates for households and for internationally operating ﬁrms as the
result of tax competition or pollution competition: in the ﬁrst case, gov-
ernments try to undercut other governments to attract ﬁrms to their coun-
try, whereas in the second, they try to push dirty industries across the
border. In both cases, the incentive for ﬁrms and households to use or
save energy is diﬀerent at the margin. Both cases call for co-ordination of
climate change policies that goes beyond a binding ceiling on greenhouse
gas emissions and international trade in permit rights among governments
alone.
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11 Introduction
Though systems of energy taxes are widely diﬀerent across countries, they have one
salient feature in common: the tax burden on ﬁrms is much lower than on households.
1
This is achieved in various ways. For example, the excise duty on diesel, which is more
important for ﬁrms than for households, is lower than on petrol. Also, ﬁrms are often
partially exempted from taxes or are refunded part of their tax payments.
2 Concerns
for competitiveness usually motivate exemptions and refunds.
Table 1 shows for several West-European countries the burden of energy taxes on
both ﬁrms and households (speciﬁcally the tax on electricity as a percentage of the
price, including the tax). In all cases, the tax on households exceeds that on frims.
Even though these data on energy taxes are imperfect measures, they conﬁrm the
picture that emerges from a detailed analysis of the tax systems.
The economic literature provides a few attempts to rationalise the diﬀerential en-
ergy taxation of households and ﬁrms. Richter and Schneider (2003) consider domestic
distortions as a motivation for a diﬀerential treatment. They ﬁnd that distortionary
taxes on labour or union power are a reason to discriminate in favour of the production
sector. Hoel (1996), on the other hand, focuses on the international externality that
arises from greenhouse gas emissions. If a large country or a group of countries wants
to decrease emissions, it has to take into account that elsewhere emissions increase, i.e.
carbon leakage. When the large country cannot rely on trade taxes and subsidies, op-
timal energy taxes for the diﬀerent sectors depend on the scale of carbon leakage that
is induced by reductions in these sectors. As household energy use and consumption
is less prone to carbon leakage, the tax on households will exceed that on ﬁrms.
In this paper we provide a third rationale for diﬀerential taxation: policy compet-
ition. If one country raises its taxes on energy use in production, it will see part of
the production relocate to other countries. Clearly, taxes on household energy con-
sumption do not have this direct eﬀect. This diﬀerence gives rise to diﬀerential energy
taxation. On the one hand, a country may want to engineer a change in its sectoral
structure, by imposing relatively high energy taxes on polluting industries. This case
is characterized by the adage: not in my backyard (NIMBY). On the other hand,
a country may want to keep and attract polluting industries, and choose for lower
taxes on ﬁrms than on households. In this paper, building on ‘new’ trade theory, the
reason for wanting to keep and attract polluting industries derives from the beneﬁts
of clustering. This case amounts to what is sometimes called ‘reverse dumping.’ More
speciﬁcally, the smaller a country is, the larger the tax diﬀerential between households
and ﬁrms. Indeed, Rietveld and Woudenberg (2005) ﬁnd evidence that small countries
tend to charge lower petrol prices than large countries. Whereas the case of ‘reverse
1We would like to thank Sjak Smulders, Paul Veenendaal and participants of seminar at
the European University Institute in Florence for comments on earlier versions.
2OECD (2001) gives an overview of the diﬀerent tax systems and provides numerous ex-
amples of the diﬀerential treatment.
2dumping’ is probably more relevant than the case of ‘not in my backyard,’ the eﬃcient
solution, in which the marginal costs of energy reductions are the same throughout
the economy, does not apply in either case.
Table 1: Electricity taxes (as a percentage of the price including taxesa)
Firms Households
Greece 7 0
Ireland 11 0
Germany 14 0
France 21 0
Italy 23 15
Finland 26 10
Netherlands 34 4
Denmark 60 17
a source: IEA (International Energy Agency)
To tackle the problem of global warming energy taxes will have to rise much
further and the problem of diﬀerential treatment will only worsen. The Kyoto Protocol
commits countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. It allows countries to
reduce emissions at home but also abroad, through intergovernmental emission trade.
This tends to equalise the marginal costs of emission reductions across countries. One
of the main contributions of this paper is to show that marginal costs of emission
reduction may become equal across countries but are not likely to become equal within
countries. Generally, governments will set diﬀerent energy tax rates for households and
ﬁrms.
The implication of diﬀerential taxation within countries is that the macro-economic
costs of implementing the Kyoto Protocol are underestimated. Evaluations with ap-
plied general-equilibrium models assess the costs to be in the range of 0.2% to 0.5% of
GDP, when international trade in emissions rights among governments is allowed for.
Typically, this is based on the assumption that within countries the marginal reduction
costs are equal. When they are not, the macroeconomic costs may rise signiﬁcantly.
A related implication is that the initiative of the European Commission to install a
system of emissions trade among ﬁrms, is very welcome, because it reduces the scope
for governments to treat households and ﬁrms diﬀerently.
Energy taxes serve diﬀerent purposes, ranging from raising revenue to correcting
local externalities. To what extent energy taxes are intended to correct for local ex-
ternalities, ranging from noise and smog to congestion, is not clear (see Newbery (1992)
and Rietveld and Woudenberg (2005)). Diﬀerential tax treatment is the outcome of
a policy to achieve a given, national, target for greenhouse gas emissions (i.e. Kyoto)
but is also the result of a policy to correct for local environmental externalities, where
3governments have the ability to set environmental standards. The objectives may
diﬀer but the problems are analytically isomorphic. This relates our paper to earlier
work by Hoel (1997) and Pﬂuger (2001). They both consider policy competition when
countries pursue environmental policies independently to correct for local externalities.
When compared to a cooperative solution, policy competition leads to environmental
standards that are either too strict (NIMBY) or too lenient (reverse dumping). This
paper extends this literature by showing that governments set diﬀerent standards for
ﬁrms and households.
3
We employ a monopolistic competition model with direct consumption of energy
and indirect consumption of the energy content of the tradeable varieties. In such a
context, governments generally choose diﬀerent energy tax rates for households and
for internationally operating ﬁrms. We consider two diﬀerent cases. First, if ﬁrms are
(assumed to be) immobile, governments choose to tax ﬁrms more than households.
The reason is that part of the ﬁrms’ energy consumption is for production of foreign
consumer goods and does not beneﬁt domestic consumers. Second, if governments take
into account relocation of ﬁrms and behave strategically, they set higher energy tax
rates for households than for ﬁrms. This is the result of tax competition: governments
try to undercut other governments to attract ﬁrms to their country.
Both cases call for co-ordination of climate change policies that goes beyond a
binding ceiling on greenhouse gas emissions and international trade in permit rights
among governments. The European Union has implemented a system of tradeable
permits, in which also ﬁrms can buy and sell permits and thus internationally face
the same incentive at the margin. This, however, will not avoid competition among
governments completely. The paper shows that governments may allocate too much
and too cheap permits to ﬁrms. The production decisions are then distorted and
government revenues are wasted.
The paper thus suggests that tighter coordination of national climate change
policies is called for to reduce the economic costs of these policies. In the European
case, the system of emission trade has to be extended to include more sectors and
perhaps households.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the model
and derives the equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the two policy competition games.
Section 4 discusses coordination. Section 5 provides a discussion of our assumptions
and results. Section 6 concludes.
3Closely related is Florax and Withagen (2003), who address the issue of diﬀerential taxa-
tion in several diﬀerent market structures with a given emission target. They analyze perfect
competition, a large country and oligopoly. The set-up of their model is more complicated
(three consumption commodities per country and two factors of production) which prevents
them from deriving analytical solutions in the oligopoly case. Our paper diﬀers, as the fo-
cus is on strategic interaction between governments and the market structure is monopolistic
competition. Our set-up moreover allows for analytical results.
42 The model
2.1 Overview of the model
The model describes a world with one production factor, two countries and three
(intermediate) goods. The supply of labour is exogenous. Labour is employed in the
production of intermediate goods, that are combined in two (non-tradeable) bundles
for ﬁnal consumption, X and Z. The X-good is a composite good of diﬀerent varieties.
The production of each variety requires labour as well as energy as an intermediate
input (the production of which also requires labour). Production of a variety is subject
to increasing returns to scale, and the producers engage in monopolistic competition.
The varieties are internationally tradeable and subject to transport costs. By assuming
an identical and constant elasticity of substitution between all diﬀerent varieties – the
simplest version of the model in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)– and identical technologies,
we obtain symmetry across varieties within a country. This we take into account
from the start. Z is a bundle of two homogenous goods of which one, the Y good, is
tradeable without costs and the other, energy E, is not.
4 Both are produced under
constant returns to scale in a sector with perfect competition. Production of both
intermediate goods, Y and E, requires the employment of labour.
The analysis assumes incomplete specialisation throughout, which results in factor
price equalisation (FPE). Incomplete specialization represents the situation that all
countries harbour energy-intensive industries and want to impose taxes on energy
use in these industries. Governments choose energy taxes given the energy taxes in
the other country. This leads to a Nash-equilibrium for the tax-policy game. When
the production of the X-good is concentrated in one country only, the nature of the
policy game changes (see Baldwin and Krugman (2002) for an example of (capital)
tax competition with complete specialisation).
The model in this paper is closer to ‘new’ trade theory (see for example Venables
(1987)) than to ‘new’ economic geography. In the latter line of research, the tendency
for ﬁrms to cluster in one region or country is magniﬁed for example by considering
intermediate deliveries among ﬁrms. The model in this paper does not incorporate
these additional eﬀects. The main reason is tractability. Nevertheless, the tendency
to cluster (near the largest market) remains.
2.2 Consumers
The utility function of the representative consumer in the home country is U =
(1 − γ)logX + γlogZ . We use subscripts i and j to denote home and foreign country
variables respectively. In many instances home and foreign are identical and we drop
4Davis (1998) argues that the usual and convenient assumption of zero transport costs is not
harmless. For the home-market eﬀect to prevail, trade costs for the homogenous good should
be ‘substantially’ lower than for the composite good. This is what we assume throughout.
5the index where it does not lead to confusion. Given that I is total income, straight-
forward optimisation yields that a constant fraction of income, PXX = (1−γ)I ≡ IX
is spent on the X good (PX is the price of the composite X good). Similar, spending
on Z is PZZ = γI ≡ IZ , and the price of Z is PZ .
Given the expenditure on diﬀerentiated goods, consumers maximise:
Xi =
h
Nix
ε−1
ε
i + Njx
ε−1
ε
j
i ε
ε−1
,ε > 1, (1)
subject to Nip
c
ixi+Njp
c
jxj = IXi . p
c denotes the consumer price of a variety, lowercase
x consumption volume of a variety and Ni the number of varieties from country i. We
introduce for later reference, NW, to indicate the total number of varieties available
in the world economy: NW ≡ Ni + Nj . Optimisation gives country i
0s demand for
country j
0s goods:
xji =

p
c
ji
PXi
−ε
Xi. (2)
Demand for goods from j in i decreases with the price that j
0s producers of varieties
charge consumers in market i relative to the price index in that market. To obtain
this price index, substitute (2) in (1):
PXi =
h
Ni (p
c
ii)
1−ε + Nj
 
p
c
ji
1−εi 1
1−ε
. (3)
The homogenous consumption good Z is a bundle of energy EZ and good Y . The
price of the Z good is:
PZ = CZ (pY ,p
z
E) (4)
where CZ is the indirect sub-utility function for the Z good, pY the price of the Y -
good, p
z
E ≡ PE(1 + t
Z) the after-tax price of energy and t
Z is the tax on energy
consumption of households.
5
2.3 Producers
Production of energy (E) and the good (Y )
Energy is produced with a linear production technology in labour only,E = LE, where
the unit labour requirement is set to unity. The market for energy is perfectly com-
petitive, and international trade in energy is ruled out for simplicity.
6
That energy is produced with labour only and constant returns to scale is perhaps
somewhat unexpected. This speciﬁcation gives, however, perfectly elastic supply of
energy, ruling out the possibility that countries try to manipulate its terms of trade
through environmental policy.
7
5We assume a convex and well-behaved function.
6In fact, making energy tradeable does not make a diﬀerence for the results. Only, the
production pattern is undetermined since there are more goods than factors.
7We want to focus our analysis on policy competition that runs via other channels than
the terms of trade.
6The homogeneous consumption good is also produced with a linear production
technology in labour only, Y = LY , where the unit labour requirement is again norm-
alised to one. It is internationally tradeable at no cost. We assume that both countries
produce Y and hence that the price of labour is identical across countries. Normalising
wages to unity gives: PY = PE = w ≡ 1.
Diﬀerentiated goods production
The production function for a speciﬁc variety is Q = F (LX,EX). The corresponding
cost function is:
CX = CX (w,p
x
E) (5)
where CX is the cost function for X-goods production and p
x
E ≡ PE(1+t
X) the after-
tax price of energy for ﬁrms. Firms have to incur variable costs as well as ﬁxed costs
of ¯ Q units of output. Thus, we can write proﬁts as:
Π = p
x  
Q − ¯ Q

− wLX − P
x
EEX,
= (p
x − cX)
 
Q − ¯ Q

− cX ¯ Q, (6)
where p
x denotes the producer price of a variety and cX is the cost-minimising cost
level of CX.
8 Since the elasticities of demand for a speciﬁc variety are identical across
countries, ﬁrms price goods for diﬀerent markets identically at the factory gate: so-
called mill pricing. The ﬁrm, facing a downward sloping demand curve (equation 2),
sets the price as a mark-up over unit costs:
p
x =
ε
ε − 1
cX. (7)
Substituting the price in the proﬁt function and setting the latter equal to zero, gives
the zero-proﬁt ﬁrm size:
 
Q − ¯ Q
 1
ε − 1
= ¯ Q, (8)
which has an intuitive interpretation: in equilibrium the product of sales multiplied
by the proﬁt margin (the lhs of equation 8) should just cover the ﬁxed costs (the rhs
of equation 8). The fact that goods are diﬀerentiated makes that consumers demand
all varieties. Firms thus supply to both the home and foreign market. Delivering
goods to the latter market is subject to iceberg transport costs: only a fraction of the
shipments arrives at the destination. τij is the share of goods that is produced in i
and arrives in j: τii = 1 and 0 < τij < 1∀i 6= j. Hence, a higher τ indicates lower
transport costs and better infrastructure. A diﬀerent way of stating this is that the
unit consumption price and the mill price diﬀer: p
c
ij = p
x
i /τij .
Budget constraints
Households earn a wage and receive a government transfer. The government taxes
energy consumption of households and energy use of ﬁrms in the X-sector. It spends
8The function is assumed to be convex and well-behaved.
7money on tradeable permits and gives a lump-sum subsidy, S, to consumers (or im-
poses a lump-sum tax) to keep the budget balanced. Substituting the government
budget in the household budget gives:
I = wL + S + t
ZPEEZ + t
XPEEX − t
E ˜ E (9)
where ˜ E is the amount of tradeable permits the government has bought at price t
E
(from the government in the other country).
Labour markets clear instantaneously and the resource constraints are always
obeyed:
L = LY + LE + NLX (10)
2.4 Equilibrium prices
The prices of the diﬀerent goods follow from the wage and energy taxes (recall that
PY = PE = w ≡ 1 and see equation 2.7 for the price of diﬀerentiated goods). To
complete the characterization of equilibrium we need to determine for each country
the number of ﬁrms or, similarly, the price index for the composite X-good. These
follow from the zero-proﬁt conditions.
For each ﬁrm in the X-sector net supply has to equal demand: Qi− ¯ Q = xii+xij/τij
. Substitute the demand functions (2) in this expression to get:
Qi − ¯ Q =
"
p
x
i
PXi
−ε
IXi +

p
x
i /τij
PXj
−ε
IXj
1
τ ij
#
. (11)
To save on notation we introduce a slightly diﬀerent measure for transport costs Tij ≡
τ
ε−1
ij Furthermore, we introduce short-hand notation for the eﬀective market size:
Wi = IXiP
ε−1
Xi .
9 Using these deﬁnitions and the expression of producer prices (7) we
can write equation (11) as:
Qi − ¯ Q =
 ε
ε − 1
cXi
−ε
[Wi + TijWj]. (12)
From the zero-proﬁt condition (equation 8) we know the equilibrium ﬁrm size. Using
this and rewriting gives:
cXi
εF = [Wi + TijWj], F = ¯ Q(ε − 1)
(ε−1)ε
ε. (13)
Using equation (13) for both countries and solving for the eﬀective market size gives:
Wi =
F
1 − TijTji

cXi
ε − TijcXj
ε
, (14)
Wj =
F
1 − TijTji

−TjicXi
ε + cXj
ε
. (15)
9The eﬀective market size combines two factors that are important for locational choice:
local expenditures and the local price index (measuring the degree of competition).
8These two equations determine the eﬀective market sizes (recall that cX is determined
by the price of labour and energy tax rates). Combining the expression for disposable
income (9) with the Cobb-Douglas spending share gives expenditure on the X-goods,
equation (14) and (15) then determine the equilibrium price indices for the X-goods.
The zero-proﬁt conditions determine indirectly, through the price indices for the
X-good, the number of varieties that each country produces. Given the price indices,
the number of ﬁrms in each country follows from the deﬁnition of these indices:
PXi =
h
Ni (p
c
ii)
1−ε + Ni
 
p
c
ji
1−εi 1
1−ε
. (16)
Consumer prices are a function of (given) wage costs, transport costs and energy tax
rates. Then the two (country) versions of equation (16) determine the allocation of
ﬁrms across countries.
3 Policy game with energy taxes
The Kyoto Protocol binds countries, that ratiﬁed the treaty, to reduce their energy
use to a given level. Governments are assumed to buy or sell emission permits and
set energy tax rates on households and ﬁrms to minimize the welfare costs of energy
reductions. This section discusses policy for two diﬀerent settings. In the ﬁrst, ﬁrms
are assumed to be immobile; in the second governments take into account ﬁrm mobility
and engage in competition to keep and attract ﬁrms. In the second setting policy
competition is strategic in the sense that governments use energy taxes to redistribute
proﬁts in their favour. First, however, we explain the general solution procedure.
3.1 The general solution
Governments are committed to keep energy use, and thus its related emissions, below
a permitted level:
¯ E + ˜ E − EZ − EX ≥ 0, (17)
i.e. the total of energy consumption by households (EZ) and ﬁrms (EX) should be
equal or less than the permitted level, which is sum of a national target ( ¯ E) and bought
emission rights ( ˜ E). Given this constraint, the government sets taxes by maximising
the following indirect utility function:
V = −(1 − γ)lnPX − γ lnPZ + lnI, (18)
where disposable income is deﬁned by equation (9).
10 The government simultaneously
chooses its three instruments ( ˜ E,t
Z,t
X) .
10The welfare function does not show disutility from the global level of energy use or related
emissions. This is not necessary since under the Kyoto agreement the level is predetermined
and constant.
9Irrespective of the policy setting, the optimal tax diﬀerential between the Z-
composite and X-composite takes the following form (the derivations are in the ap-
pendix):
t
Z − t
X =
1
∆a
h
−
∂EX
∂tX +
∂EZ
∂tX

EZA
a
Z −
∂EZ
∂tZ +
∂EX
∂tZ

EXA
a
X
i
, (19)
where the determinant ∆ is positive and deﬁned as: ∆
a =
∂EX
∂tX
∂EZ
∂tZ −
∂EX
∂tZ
∂EZ
∂tX >
0 . Between parenthesis are the marginal eﬀects of taxes on energy use, and A is
an outcome of the optimisation (with subscripts indicating sectors and superscripts
indicating diﬀerent cases).
Usually, a ﬁrst-best, eﬃcient solution (fb) does not entail a wedge between mar-
ginal reduction costs for households and for ﬁrms (A
fb
X = A
fb
Z = 0) and the two energy
tax rates are the same and equal to the price of tradeable permits: t
X = t
Z = t
E.
Assumption A
We assume that
∂EX
∂tX +
∂EZ
∂tX ≡
∂E
∂tX < 0,
∂EZ
∂tZ +
∂EX
∂tZ ≡
∂E
∂tZ < 0,
which says that the direct eﬀect of an energy tax exceeds the indirect eﬀect.
Hence, the instruments are eﬀective.
This allows us to write equation (3.3) more concise:
t
Z − t
X =
1
∆
h
−
 ∂E
∂tX

EZA
a
Z −
 ∂E
∂tZ

EXA
a
X
i
. (20)
With eﬀective instruments, taxes on households are larger than on ﬁrms if A
a
Z> 0
and/or A
a
X> 0 .
3.2 Taxation without ﬁrm mobility
Governments may choose their taxes while taking the number of ﬁrms as given. In
this setting they overlook the eﬀect of their taxes on location choices. With a ﬁxed
number of ﬁrms, governments expect relocation of polluting activities to occur through
the usual channel of imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign varieties: a
higher energy tax for ﬁrms raises the price of domestic varieties and demand shifts to
foreign varieties.
11
The case without (assumed) ﬁrm mobility is relevant for two reasons. First, chan-
ging the assumption about ﬁrm mobility - a case with ﬁrm mobility is discussed later
- helps to show how important this assumption is for the results of policy compet-
ition with energy taxes. Second, nearly every AGE-model assumes imperfect sub-
stitution between varieties of diﬀerent origin (the Armington assumption) and does
not incorporate location decisions. The case without ﬁrm mobility indicates what
model-consistent government behaviour is in these AGE-models.
12
11The governments do have a correct perception of the energy-tax elasticity.
12Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) discuss in more detail the similarities between the Arming-
ton assumption of imperfect substitution and the Dixit-Stiglitz formulation.
10Here we discuss informally the diﬀerent sides of the optimisation problem for the
governments when setting the tax rates (and trading emission permits), and we present
their optimal response. The formal analysis is relegated to the appendix.
Raising the tax rate on ﬁrms above the tax rate for households has a distortionary
eﬀect: the marginal costs of energy reductions becomes higher for ﬁrms than for
households. Creating a tax diﬀerential at the expense of ﬁrms has, on the other hand,
the eﬀect that the tax burden partly falls on foreigners. The government balances
these negative and positive eﬀects of a tax diﬀerential. Formally, we show that:
A
n
X = −1 +
xii
Qi − ¯ Q
, A
n
Z = 0. (21)
The term xii/(Q− ¯ Q) is the share of domestic deliveries in net output; the right-hand
side thus represents the export share. Since the share is between zero and one, the
sign of A
n
X is negative. The government chooses to tax ﬁrms more than households
(see the expression for the tax diﬀerential 4). Only when a country does not export,
it will choose the ﬁrst-best solution in which the marginal costs of energy savings are
the same throughout the economy. Without exports a country cannot shift the burden
abroad.
When the cross-eﬀects of the energy taxes are ignored,
∂EZ
∂tX =
∂EX
∂tZ = 0 , we get a
convenient expression for the tax diﬀerential:
e
EX
tX
 
t
Z − t
X
= −

1 −
xii
Qi − ¯ Q

t
X, (22)
where e
EX
tX is the elasticity of energy use with respect to the energy tax on ﬁrms. This
shows not only that the tax for ﬁrms is higher than for households, but also that
the diﬀerential diminishes with the tax elasticity of energy demand: a familiar result.
The fact that the tax incidence falls partly upon foreigners leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 NIMBY without strategic interaction
Without strategic interaction between the two governments (thus where ﬁrm
mobility is assumed to be absent) the energy tax on the manufactured
composite X is higher than the energy tax on the consumption composite
Z, t
X > t
Z, as long as a part of the manufactured goods is exported,
xii
Qi− ¯ Q < 1 .
The proof consists of solving the government’s optimisation problem and solving for
the tax diﬀerential. Details of the proofs / derivations of the results summarised in
the propositions are in the appendix. This proposition says that a country uses energy
taxes on ﬁrms to shift the tax burden onto the other country. Or, saying the same
from a diﬀerent perspective, governments try to shift polluting industries abroad (Not
In My Back Yard).
113.3 Strategic tax competition
The case without (assumed) ﬁrm mobility is not particularly realistic. Governments
overlook the direct eﬀect of energy taxes on location choices and are as a result un-
concerned with ‘competitiveness’, i.e. the fact that energy taxes erode the position
of industrial ﬁrms on the international markets and lead to a relocation of industrial
activities. In fact, in this case governments impose higher energy taxes on ﬁrms than
on households. This is in clear contradiction with the stylized fact that the burden of
energy taxes is lower for ﬁrms than it is for households.
The case with ﬁrm mobility is more convincing. In this case, governments do take
into account that the energy taxes are relevant for location choices. They are concerned
about relocation: a decrease in the number of domestic ﬁrms (and an increase in the
number of foreign ﬁrms) tends to raise the consumption price index of the X-goods,
since consumers incur transport costs when importing foreign varieties.
The eﬀect on location choices runs via two channels. First, by raising tax rates the
government raises the production costs of domestic ﬁrms that thereby become less
competitive relative to foreign ﬁrms and less proﬁtable. The cost diﬀerential forces
some domestic ﬁrms to leave business or to relocate their production abroad. Second,
by raising tax rates, of which the burden partly falls on foreign consumers, the gov-
ernment increases national income and spending. This is a beneﬁt in itself, but also
has the eﬀect that it raises the (eﬀective) size of the domestic market and proﬁts for
domestic ﬁrms.
There are, however, more considerations than the location of ﬁrms. Of course,
creating a tax diﬀerential between households and ﬁrms leads to a diﬀerence in the
marginal costs of energy reduction. Besides, in this full-ﬂedged case governments are
also concerned with a static distortion between the Z-good and the X-good, that
follows from monopolistic competition in the production of the latter good. This
distortion is mitigated when the energy tax for ﬁrms is higher than for households,
leading to a smaller price diﬀerential between the Z-good and X-good. Since the
distortion is domestic in origin and has little or nothing to do with policy competition,
we choose to introduce an ad-valorem constant consumption tax on the Z-good t
C.
The tax rate is such that the price of the Z-good is a factor
ε
ε−1 higher than its
production costs, t
C =
1
ε−1 .
13 In ﬁrst-best equilibrium this would just correct the
consequences of mark-up pricing in the X-sector:
Assumption B
In the remainder we assume that governments in both countries impose a
constant advalorem consumption tax on the Z-good in order to correct
for the price distortion that results from mark-up pricing in the
13Rather than keeping the tax rate constant, it could be included in the set of instruments
for the governments. This does not have consequences for the subsequent analysis and its
results.
12X-sector: t
C =
1
ε−1.
Using Assumption B, we can derive that:
A
s
X = −1 +
cXi
ε
cXi
ε − TcXj
ε
PXiXi
Nipi(Qi − ¯ Q)
, A
s
Z = 0. (23)
An alternative expression is
A
s
X = −1 +
1
1 − T 2
1
s ii
, sii =
Nip
1−ε
i
Nip
1−ε
i + NjTp
1−ε
j
, (24)
where sii is again the market share of ﬁrms in country i on their home market.
We can evaluate the tax diﬀerential by evaluating A
s
X. Two eﬀects play a role. The
ﬁrst is related to the position of home ﬁrms in the international market and is captured
by the ﬁrst factor (cf. equations 14 and 15). Governments tax mobile ﬁrms less if the
cost advantage of home ﬁrms over foreign ﬁrms, including transport, becomes smaller.
The second eﬀect is related to tax revenue and is captured by the second factor in
equation (23) which is the ratio of total consumption to total production of the X-
good. If the tax base is small, because most goods are imported, raising the tax does
not generate substantial revenues (nor does it reduce energy use substantially).
In a symmetric equilibrium the production costs in the X-sector are the same in
each country and the net exports and imports are zero, so that the second factor is
unity. In this equilibrium it is clear from equation 23 that A
s
X = T/(1−T) > 0 . This
implies that the tax diﬀerential between households and ﬁrms is positive. In other
words, energy consumption of households is taxed more heavily than energy use by
ﬁrms. This is in clear contrast with the previous case without assumed ﬁrm mobility,
summarized in Proposition 1. The diﬀerence between the two cases results from the
assumption about ﬁrm mobility and location choices. Governments take into account
that energy taxes on ﬁrms push them abroad and that importing their products is
costly, as a result of transport costs. The following proposition summarises this result.
Proposition 2 Strategic competition and reverse dumping in a symmet-
ric equilibrium
With strategic policy competition, and a symmetric equilibrium, the energy
tax on consumption goods Z is unambiguously higher than the energy tax
on the manufactured composite X. The tax diﬀerential is decreasing in
the elasticity of ﬁrms’ energy use with respect to their energy tax.
The proof consists of solving the government’s optimisation problem, while taking into
account ﬁrm relocation and solving for the Nash tax diﬀerential. The intuition for the
result is as follows. In a ﬁrst-best world, governments prefer to equal tax rates so
as to prevent a distortion in energy consumption. However, being aware that a tax
on energy-intensive, manufactured goods shifts the production of these goods abroad
makes that governments set a lower tax on energy use in the production of these goods.
13The last part of the proposition – that the tax diﬀerential is decreasing in the tax
elasticity of ﬁrms’ energy use – is a corollary of the standard result that the dead-weight
loss of taxes (or a tax diﬀerence) is larger, the more elastic demand is.
Suppose that starting in a symmetric equilibrium country i gains a comparative
advantage in the production of the X-goods. This advantage could arise in two ways.
First, country i could become larger through population growth or overall technical
change, leaving the unit production costs in the X-sector unaltered. Firms will relocate
towards the larger market. Country i wants a smaller tax diﬀerential, since it becomes
a net exporter (see equation 23) and increases its market share at home and abroad
(see equation 24). Second, the production costs in the X-sector may fall as a result
of technical change in this sector. With a cost diﬀerential in favour of country i, its
market share will increase. Relocation of ﬁrms towards country i only reinforces this.
It is thus inclined to choose for a lower tax diﬀerential than country j (see equation 24).
Irrespective of the reason for the comparative advantage, the country that specializes
in the production of the X-good and becomes a net exporter, is inclined to have a
smaller tax diﬀerential than the net importer.
Whether the net exporter does indeed opt for a smaller tax diﬀerential than a net
importer, also depends on the derivatives of energy demand to energy taxes. In an
asymmetric equilibrium these can be diﬀerent for the diﬀerent countries. Only near
a symmetric equilibrium and for a small cost diﬀerential, it is certain that the net
exporter will have a smaller tax diﬀerential than the net importer.
Proposition 3 Strategic competition between asymmetric countries
When, starting from a symmetric equilibrium, country i specializes in the
production of the energy-intensive X-good and becomes a net exporter,
country i will choose a smaller tax diﬀerential between households and
ﬁrms than the other country j, that is a net importer:
AXi
s > AXj
s.
Hence, larger countries tend to have a smaller tax diﬀerential.
4 Tax coordination
In the two cases of tax competition (section 18 and 19) governments choose a dif-
ferential treatment of households and ﬁrms. In both cases a tax diﬀerential follows
from attempts to ‘beggar thy neighbour’. Without (assumed) ﬁrm mobility govern-
ments attempt to let the tax burden fall partly on foreign consumers, while pushing
polluting-activities abroad. With ﬁrm mobility and strategic considerations, they try
to lure ﬁrms into their country by undercutting the other country’s energy tax on
internationally competing and mobile ﬁrms. Both cases suggest opportunities for co-
ordination.
This section derives the tax structure that emerges when governments are able
to commit to a tax scheme that maximises joint welfare. With coordination, they
14take into account two cross-border eﬀects in particular. First, an energy tax in one
country aﬀects energy demand in the other country. Second, and more importantly,
they incorporate that a relocation of ﬁrm to one country may hurt the other. This
goes to the heart of the problem with tax competition.
With coordination, the expression for the tax diﬀerential is not as simple with
competition (see equation 19). However, the outcome of joint optimisation is still
adequately characterized by the terms A
c
X and A
c
Z :
A
c
Xi = −1 +

c
ε
Xi
cε
Xi − Tcε
Xj
−
Tc
ε
Xi
cε
Xj − Tcε
Xi

PXiXi
Nipi(Qi − ¯ Q)
, A
c
Z = 0, (25)
when Assumption B applies. Again, an alternative expression is
A
c
Xi = −1 +
1
1 − T 2
1
sii

1 − T
c
ε
Xi − Tc
ε
Xj
cε
Xj − Tcε
Xi

. (26)
In a symmetric equilibrium the term in square brackets in equation 25 is equal to one.
Countries take into account that – through the entry conditions and the allocation
of ﬁrms – they aﬀect the price index of the X-good in both countries. Besides, in a
symmetric equilibrium, the consumption value equals the production value of output,
so that A
c
X = 0 . Hence, with policy coordination there is no tax diﬀerential.
Proposition 4 Coordination and taxation
With tax coordination and in a symmetric equilibrium, governments agree
to avoid a tax diﬀerential between the consumption composite (Z) and
the manufactured composite (X).
A small perturbation of the symmetric equilibrium provides insight in the outcome
of policy coordination between two asymmetric countries. Suppose that production
costs in the X-sector are the same but that country i becomes slightly larger than
j. The familiar home-market eﬀect will pull production of the X-good more than
proportionally towards country i. It will see its share on both markets increase. In
other words, country i becomes a net exporter and country j a net importer. This
results in A
c
Xi < 0 and A
c
Xj > 0 , implying a higher energy tax for ﬁrms in country i
and a lower energy tax in country j. The tax diﬀerential between the two countries
corrects the excessive agglomeration that prevails in the larger country with free trade.
Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2002) end up with comparable results when considering
policy coordination of capital taxes.
14 The intuition for excessive agglomeration is the
business stealing eﬀect: ﬁrms entering the market do no take into account that they
reduce the demand for other ﬁrms (Mankiw and Whinston (1986)).
14Their analysis starts however with a quasi-linear utility function, whereas ours starts
with a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model. They analyse tax competition without environmental
problems.
15Now, assume instead that countries remain equal in size but that country i attains
slightly lower costs than country j. Then again, by inspection of equation 26, follows:
A
c
Xi < 0 and A
c
Xj > 0 . This implies higher taxation of the X-good in the low-cost
country and vice versa. Inspection of equation 4.2 learns that this occurs even for a
given allocation of ﬁrms. This points at another reason than excessive agglomeration
for diﬀerent tax structures in the two countries. Given the allocation of ﬁrms, country
i beneﬁts more from the cost decrease than country j. The home bias in consumption
is responsible for that. The relocation as a result of the cost diﬀerential will only
worsen the distribution of the welfare gain. Through diﬀerent energy taxes on ﬁrms,
the welfare gain is partly taken from the low-cost country and redistributed to the
high-cost country. We summarise the results on the asymmetric case by formulating
the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Coordination between asymmetric countries
When starting from a symmetric equilibrium, country i gains a slight
comparative advantage in the production of the energy-intensive X-good
and becomes a net exporter of that good, countries i and j will partly
oﬀset this advantage by higher energy taxes on ﬁrms in country i and l
ower taxes in country j.
Countries use energy tax rates to aﬀect agglomeration. The underlying reason is that
they lack instruments to aﬀect the allocation of ﬁrms directly. For example, they are
not allowed to discriminate between domestic and foreign ﬁrms, for example through
import tariﬀs or through state subsidies (cf.Hoel (1996), and Rauscher (1995)).
5 Discussion of assumptions and results
Every case that has been discussed so far, led to the result that AZ = 0 . This changes
when assumption B is dropped and the static, domestic distortion as the result of
mark-up pricing in the X-sector is reintroduced. Energy taxes will then be set such
that the static distortion is mitigated: with AZ > 0 government will choose to tax
energy-use in the production of the Z-good more than that in the production of the
X-good, thereby reducing the price diﬀerence between the two goods. This holds for
both the case of strategic policy competition and for the case of policy coordination.
In contrast, the assumption of intergovernmental trade in emission rights does
not eﬀect the results as summarized in the expressions for AX. International trade
in permits eliminates any diﬀerence in the average tax rate between countries (more
precisely, the diﬀerence in the social marginal costs of energy reductions) but does not
essentially aﬀect the tax structure within countries.
With policy competition, governments choose to tax diﬀerent sectors diﬀerently.
In the case without ﬁrm mobility, the energy tax rate in the X-sector is higher than
that in the Z-sector, whereas it is the other way around in the more realistic case with
16ﬁrm mobility. Either way, the assumption that the tax diﬀerential within a country is
not aﬀected does not hold. Typically, the model simulations to assess the costs of the
Kyoto Protocol are based on this assumption; the costs are thus underestimated.
Corollary 6 The cost of the Kyoto protocol
Energy reductions are more costly with tax diﬀerentials across the sectors
than with a uniform energy tax. Since the Kyoto Protocol does not prevent
policy competition that leads to these tax diﬀerentials, a cost assessment
should take them into account.
This corollary follows directly from Propositions (1 or) 2 and 4. Normally, the costs of
the Kyoto Protocol are underestimated, but so are the beneﬁts of a system with inter-
ﬁrm trade in emission rights, such as the European Commission has installed. It goes
to the heart of the problem with policy competition: with such a system governments
lose the ability to set the (marginal) energy tax rate for internationally mobile ﬁrms
and no longer compete with each other. Indeed, we can show that
Proposition 7 Partial coordination in a symmetric equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, coordination of just the energy taxes on ﬁrms
is enough to ensure that (after-tax) energy prices are the same across
countries as well as for ﬁrms and households.
Policy competition makes the case for a system of inter-ﬁrm trade strong, but may also
undermine such a system. Suppose that a government cannot aﬀect the emission price
but is allowed to grant internationally mobile ﬁrms emission rights. That is similar to
a situation in which the government cannot set the marginal tax rate on energy use
but is still allowed to choose the average tax rate. For example, part of the energy
use is exempted from energy taxes. We can show that in the case of strategic policy
competition governments have a positive incentive to let the average energy tax rate
(for ﬁrms in the X-sector) fall below the marginal tax rate.
Proposition 8 Emission trade among ﬁrms in a symmetric equilibrium
Within a system of emission trade among ﬁrms governments cannot directly
manipulate the marginal energy tax rate for ﬁrms, i.e. the emission price.
However, they will continue to compete strategically through the allocation
of emission rights to ﬁrms, driving a wedge between the tax rates on ﬁrms
and households in a symmetric equilibrium.
6 Conclusions
If environmental policy is not coordinated across countries, policy will not be set
socially optimal. As the marginal costs of emission reductions will generally be set
17diﬀerently between sectors of a country, the ﬁrst-best is achieved. We derive this result
in a monopolistic competition model where governments optimally set taxes, and trade
in emission permits. Hence, permit trade is not a suﬃcient means of coordination in
order to minimise the costs of implementing the Kyoto protocol. As the costs of
diﬀerential taxation within countries are overlooked in the evaluation of the costs of
Kyoto, these costs tend to be underestimated.
We considered two diﬀerent cases of policy competition. First, when ﬁrms are
assumed to be immobile, governments choose to tax ﬁrms more than households.
The reason is that part of the ﬁrms’ energy consumption is for production of foreign
consumer goods and does not beneﬁt domestic consumers. Second, if governments take
into account relocation of ﬁrms and behave strategically, they set higher energy tax
rates for households than for ﬁrms. This is the result of tax competition: governments
try to undercut other governments to attract ﬁrms to their country.
Both cases call for co-ordination of climate change policies that goes beyond a
binding ceiling on greenhouse gas emissions and international trade in permit rights
among governments. The European Union has implemented a system of tradeable
permits, in which ﬁrms can buy and sell permits and thus internationally face the same
incentive at the margin. This, however, will not avoid competition among governments
completely. The paper shows that governments have an incentive to favour ﬁrms in
the allocation of permits. The production decisions are then distorted and government
revenues are wasted.
The paper thus suggests that tighter coordination of national climate change
policies is called for to reduce the economic costs of these policies. In the European
case, the system of emission trade has to be extended to include more sectors and
perhaps households.
References
Acemoglu, D. and J. Ventura, 2002, The world income distribution, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, vol. 117, pp. 659–694.
Baldwin, R. and P. Krugman, 2002, Agglomeration, integration and tax harmonisa-
tion, Working Paper 9290, NBER.
Davis, D.R., 1998, The home market, trade, and industrial structure, American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 88(5), pp. 1264–1276.
Dimaranan, B.V. and R.A. McDougall, 2002, Global trade, assistance, and production:
The gtap 5 data base, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.
Dixit, A.K. and J.E. Stiglitz, 1977, Monopolistic competition and optimum product
diversity, American Economic Review, vol. 67, pp. 297–308.
18Florax, A.M., F. J. G. M. and C.A. Withagen, 2003, Optimal environmental policy
diﬀerentials under emission constraints, mimeo Free University Amsterdam.
Hoel, M., 1996, Should a carbon tax be diﬀerential across sectors?, Journal of Public
Economies, vol. 59, pp. 17–32.
Hoel, M., 1997, Environmental policy with endogenous plant locations, Scandinavian
Journal of Economies, vol. 99, pp. 241–259.
Mankiw, N.G. and M.D. Whinston, 1986, Free entry and social ineﬃciency, Rand
Journal of Economics, vol. 17, pp. 48–58.
Newbery, D.M., 1992, Should carbon taxes be additional to other transport fuel taxes?,
Energy Journal, vol. 13, pp. 49–60.
OECD, 2001, Environmentally related taxes in oecd countries, Tech. rep., OECD,
Paris.
Ottaviano, G.I.P. and T. van Ypersele, 2002, Market access and tax competition,
Discussion Paper 3638, CEPR.
Pﬂuger, M., 2001, Ecological dumping under monopolistic competition, Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, vol. 103, pp. 689–706.
Rauscher, M., 1995, Environmental regulation and the location of polluting industries,
International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 2, pp. 229–244.
Richter, W.F. and K. Schneider, 2003, Energy taxation: Reasons for discriminating in
favor of the production sector, European Economic Review, vol. 47, pp. 461–476.
Rietveld, P. and S. Woudenberg, 2005, Why fuel prices diﬀer, Energy Economics,
vol. 27, pp. 79–92.
Venables, A.J., 1987, Trade and trade policy with diﬀerentiated products: A cham-
berlinian ricardian model, Economic Journal, vol. 97 (387), pp. 700–717.
Appendix
Deriving Nash taxes without strategic considerations (proof of pro-
position 1)
The government maximises:
MAX V = −(1 − γ)lnPX − γ lnPZ + lnI + λ
 
¯ E + ˜ E − EZ − EX

, (27)
where
I = wL + S + t
ZPEEZ + t
XPEEX − t
E ˜ E (28)
19This gives the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
∂V
∂tZ = −
γ
PZ
∂PZ
∂P z
E
∂P
z
E
∂tZ +
1
I

EZ + t
Z ∂EZ
∂tZ + t
x∂EX
∂tZ

−λ
∂EZ
∂tZ −
∂EX
∂tZ

= 0, (29)
∂V
∂tX = −
1 − γ
PX
∂PX
∂Pii
∂Pii
∂cX
∂cX
∂P x
E
∂P
x
E
∂tX +
1
I

EX + t
Z ∂EZ
∂tX + t
X ∂EX
∂tX

−λ
∂EZ
∂tX −
∂EX
∂tX

= 0,
(30)
∂V
∂ ˜ E
= −
t
E
I
+ λ = 0. (31)
Using that the price energy-tax elasticities are equal to the production cost share of
energy, the ﬁrst two expression can subsequently be simpliﬁed to:

t
Z ∂EZ
∂tZ + t
X ∂EX
∂tZ

= λI
∂EZ
∂tZ −
∂EX
∂tZ

, (32)
and:
(1 − sii)EX +

t
Z ∂EZ
∂tX + t
X ∂EX
∂tX

= λI
∂EZ
∂tX −
∂EX
∂tX

. (33)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of this expression the share of X-goods that is
exported: sii =
xii
Qi
ε
ε−1 . Substituting the third ﬁrst order condition we can rewrite
this as a system of two equations and two unknowns:
 ∂EZ
∂tZ
∂EX
∂tZ
∂EZ
∂tX
∂EX
∂tX

t
Z − t
E
t
X − t
E

=

0
−(1 − sii)EX

, (34)
solving the expression for the two tax-permit-price diﬀerentials allows to calculate:
t
Z − t
X =
(1 − sii)EX
∆
∂EZ
∂tZ +
∂EX
∂tZ

. (35)
where ∆ =
∂EX
∂tX
∂EZ
∂tZ −
∂EX
∂tZ
∂EZ
∂tX > 0 as the direct eﬀects of the energy taxes exceed
the indirect eﬀects. This implies that the tax on ﬁrms exceeds that on consumers (if
sii>0)
Deriving Nash taxes with strategic considerations (proof of proposi-
tion 2 and 3)
The set-up is analogous to that discussed above. Strategic considerations, however,
are taken into account. That is, governments take into account that by raising tax
rates they raise the cost of domestically producing ﬁrms that thereby become less
competitive to ﬁrms producing abroad. This has the consequence that ﬁrms may
relocate to the other country. Technically speaking, this eﬀect can be divided in two
parts. First, governments do not only take into account the direct eﬀect of a tax on
the price level but also the indirect eﬀect of the tax on the price level that runs via
relocation of ﬁrms. That is the fact that some goods, ﬁrst produced at home (and
consumed without bearing transport costs), need to be imported after that raising
taxes ‘pushed’ them out of the country. Taking this eﬀect into account means that
the indirect eﬀect of prices, running via the change in the eﬀective market size is to
20be taken into account. Second, any policy measure that changes income levels has an
eﬀect on the eﬀective market size via the spending level on X goods that is directly
aﬀect by income. Thus we use the deﬁnition of the eﬀective market size Wj = IXiP
ε−1
Xi
to get the price eﬀect of changing the eﬀective market size:
Wi =
1
1 − TijTji

FicXi
ε − TijFjcXj
ε
, (36)
Now the ﬁrst-order conditions can be derived as:
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Simplifying the ﬁrst-order conditions again leads to a system of two equations and two
unknowns:
 ∂EZ
∂tZ
∂EX
∂tZ
∂EZ
∂tX
∂EX
∂tX

t
Z − t
E
t
X − t
E

=
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
−
1−γ
ε−γEZ
−

1 −
ε
ε−γ
cε
X
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X−Tcε
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PXX
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EX
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, (40)
We introduce notation:
M
S ≡ −

1 −
ε
ε − γ
c
ε
Xi
cε
Xi − Tcε
Xj
PXX
Np(Q − ¯ Q)

> 0. (41)
where M is to be read as the import quote or 1/M as an indication of the size of the
country. Solving for the tax-diﬀerential gives:
t
Z − t
X =
1
∆
∂EX
∂tX +
∂EZ
∂tX

−
1 − γ
ε − γ
EZ

−
∂EZ
∂tZ +
∂EX
∂tZ
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M
SEX

. (42)
We use the following assumptions:
dE =
∂EZ
∂tZ +
∂EX
∂tZ

dt
Z< 0. (43)
and the analog for the tax on manufacturing ﬁrms. These conditions say that for
marginal changes the direct negative eﬀect on energy use of a tax exceeds the indirect
positive eﬀect.
Using these assumptions and the fact that the three terms in parenthesis in equa-
tion (42) all exceed one, we obtain the result that the taxation on households exceeds
that on ﬁrms.
Expression (42) is more insightful if we set the indirect eﬀects of energy taxes on
energy use equal to zero:
t
Z − t
X =
 1
eZZ

−
1 − γ
ε − γ

t
Z −
 1
eXX

M
St
X

. (44)
21Deriving coordinated taxes (proof of proposition 4 and 5)
With coordination the governments maximise a utilitarian joint welfare function:
MAX V =
1
2
X
i
[−(1 − γ)lnPXi − γ lnPZi + lnIi], (45)
subject to
Ii = wi − Ti + t
Z
i EZi + t
X
i EXi − t
E ˜ Ei,∀i,j, (46)
¯ Ei + ˜ Ei − EZi − EXi = 0,∀i,j (47)
and use Wj = IXiP
ε−1
Xi and Wi =
1
1−TijTji

FicXi
ε − TijFjcXj
ε
.
The derivation of the ﬁrst-order conditions for t
Z
1 ,t
Z
2 ,t
X
1 ,t
X
2 , ˜ E1(= − ˜ E2) is straight-
forward:
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−
t
E1
I1
+
1 − γ
PX2
−
1 − γ
PX1
+
∂PX1
∂I1
∂I1
∂ ˜ E1
−
∂PX2
∂I2
∂I2
∂ ˜ E1
+ λ1 − λ2 = 0. (50)
Solving the tax-diﬀerential gives:
t
Z
i − t
X
i =
1
∆i
h
∂EX1
∂tX
i
+
∂EZi
∂tX
i
 
−
1−γ
ε−γEZi
i
−
1
∆i

∂EZi
∂tZ
i
+
∂EXi
∂tZ
i

1 −
ε
ε−γ

cε
Xi
cε
Xi
−Tcε
Xj
−
Tcε
Xi
cε
Xj
−Tcε
Xi

PXiXi
Nipi(Qi− ¯ Q)

EXi

. (51)
Introducing Assumption B in this expression gives:
t
Z
i −t
X
i = −
1
∆i

∂EZi
∂tZ
i
+
∂EXi
∂tZ
i

1 −

c
ε
Xi
cε
Xi − Tcε
Xj
−
Tc
ε
Xi
cε
Xj − Tcε
Xi

PXiXi
Nipi(Qi − ¯ Q)

EXi

.
(52)
This completes the proof.
The EC proposal (proof of proposition 7 and 8)
The EC proposal allows inter-ﬁrm trade in emission rights. To analyse this, we use
the following set up. Suppose that the total level of emissions by X-ﬁrms is ﬁxed
22(E
T
F) and that each country receives a ﬁxed part of the total emission rights. In other
words, the revenues from selling emission rights is divided between the two countries:
t
EE
T
F = t
EE
∗
F1 + t
EE
∗
F2. Suppose furthermore that the total level of emissions is set
such that the coordinated symmetric equilibrium is reproduced if t
F = t
Z1 = t
Z2.
Within this set up, governments do not try to inﬂuence emissions by ﬁrms in the X-
sector in their country. The key element, however, is that governments can give ﬁrms,
located in their country, emission rights for free. These we denote by ¯ EF. This boils
down to a production subsidy, such that equation (8) in the main text is changed to
 
Q − ¯ Q
 1
ε − 1
= ¯ Q −
t
E ¯ EF
cX
, (53)
The optimisation problem for the government can than be written as
MAX V = −(1 − γ)lnPX − γ lnPZ + lnI, (54)
subject to
Ez + ˜ E − E
∗
z = 0 (55)
PX =

W
(1 − γ)I
 1
ε−1
(56)
I =
˜ I
1 −
γr
1+r
r =
1
ε − 1
(57)
˜ I = wL + t
ZEZ − t
E ˜ E + t
FE
∗
F − t
FN ¯ EF (58)
The goverment has three instruments: the amount of emission rights ( ˜ E), the tax on
energy use by consumers (t
Z) and the amount of permits donated to X-ﬁrms ( ¯ EF).
Now the ﬁrst-order conditions can be derived as:
∂V
∂ ˜ E
= −
tE
I −
1−γ
PX +
∂PX
∂ ˜ I
∂ ˜ I
∂ ˜ E + λ = 0
⇔
 
1 +
1−γ
ε−1

t
E = λ˜ I (59)
∂V
∂tZ = −
γ
PZ
∂PZ
∂Pz
E
∂Pz
E
∂tZ +
1
˜ I
 
EZ + t
Z ∂EZ
∂tZ

−
1−γ
PX
∂PX
∂ ˜ I
 
EZ + t
Z ∂EZ
∂tZ

− λ
 
∂EZ
∂tZ

= 0
⇔ −
γEZ
PZZ +
 
1 +
1−γ
ε−1

EZ
˜ I +
∂EZ
∂tZ
 
1 +
1−γ
ε−1

tZ
˜ I + λ

= 0 (60)
∂V
∂ ¯ EF
= −
t
FN
˜ I
−
1 − γ
PX

∂PX
∂W
∂W
∂ ¯ EF
+
∂PX
∂˜ I
∂˜ I
∂ ¯ EF

−
t
F ¯ EFN
˜ I
∂N
∂ ¯ EF
(61)
The ﬁrst two terms in equation 60 ad up to zero as (1 + t
Z)PZZ = γI and I =
ε
ε−γ ˜ I.
Then combining 59 with 60 gives that t
Z = t
E. This completes the prove of proposition
7.
23To prove prosition 8 we need to analyse equation 61 somewhat further. We can
rewrite 61 as
∂V
∂ ¯ EF
= −
t
F
˜ I

N + ¯ EF
∂N
∂ ¯ EF

−
1 − γ
PX

1
ε − 1
PX
W
−
1
1 − T 2ε
ε(ε − 1)
ε−1c
ε
X
t
F
cX
−
1
ε − 1
PX
˜ I

(62)
Deﬁning the permit-number of ﬁrms elasticity as σ
N
¯ EF =
¯ EF
N
∂N
∂ ¯ EF and use the deﬁnition
of the eﬀective market size Wj = IXiP
ε−1
Xi and the expession for the eﬀective market
size 6.10, to rewrite 6.36 as
−
N
˜ I
 
1 + σ
N
¯ EF

1 + −
1 − γ
ε − 1

+
1 − γ
ε − 1

c
ε
Xi
cε
XiFi − Tijcε
XjFj
1
cXi

= 0 (63)
Use I =
ε
ε−γ ˜ I and the fact that (1−γ)I = PX(Q− ¯ Q)N and the symmetry assumption
to see that
(1 − γ)N
(ε − 1)cXFN(1 − T)
=
ε(1 − γ)N
(ε − 1)PX(Q − ¯ Q)N(1 − T)
(64)
Then 64 simplyﬁes to
−
 
1 + σ
N
¯ EF

+
1
1 − T
(65)
ﬁnally, if ¯ EF goes to zero, σ
N
¯ EF goes to zero and the expression is positive. This implies
that for this ﬁrst-order condition to hold governments tend to subsidise their ﬁrms by
donating emission rights. This completes the proof
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